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THE BILLABLE HOURS DERBY: EMPIRICAL
DATA ON THE PROBLEMS AND PRESSURE
POINTS
by Susan Saab Fortney
If you ask law firm attorneys to identify their biggest complaint related
to private law practice, most will probably respond with one word: billing.1
At the same time, clients are likely to identify billing as their most serious
concern associated with obtaining legal services.2 The irony in clients and
attorneys sharing frustration over hourly billing relates to the fact that the
initial interest in hourly billing stemmed from attorneys’ desire to be
efficient and to maximize their earnings and clients’ preference for only
paying for the actual time expended on their behalf.3 Since the 1960s,
hourly billing has evolved as the dominant billing method used by non-

1. As explained by President of the American Bar Association, Robert E. Hirshon, in
his Preface to the A.B.A Commission on Billable Hours Report, “It has become increasingly
clear that many of the legal profession’s contemporary woes intersect at the billable hour.”
A.B.A. COMMISSION ON BILLABLE HOURS REPORT 2001-2002, available at
http://www.abanet.org/careercounsel/billable.toolkit/bhcomplete.pdf at ix [hereinafter
A.B.A. BILLABLE HOURS COMMISSION REPORT].
2. A recent American Bar Association Section of Litigation study on public
perceptions of attorneys found attorneys fees to be at the heart of many consumers’ negative
experiences with attorneys. According to the study report: “Of all the criticism that
consumers raise about their personal experiences with lawyers, the greatest number of
complaints arise around lawyers’ fees. Consumers say that lawyers charge too much for
their services, are often not up front about their fees, and are unwilling to account for their
charges or hours.” Leo J. Shapiro & Associates, Public Perceptions of Lawyers–Consumer
A.B.A
SEC.
LITIG.
14,
available
at
Research
Findings,
2002
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/lawyers/publicperceptions.pdf.
3. In the 1960s, management consultants suggested that attorneys who used hourly
billing to determine their fees made more than those who used other methods. Stephen W.
Jones & Melissa Bear Glover, The Attack on Traditional Billing Practices, 20 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 293, 294 (1998). At the same time, corporate managers and members
of the business community reportedly welcomed hourly billing because it enabled clients to
“correlate the ‘product’ that they are buying to the products they themselves produced and
sold.” William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1,
11 n.64 (1991) (citing Mary Ann Altman, A Perspective–From Value Billing to Time Billing
and Back to Value Billing, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF
ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS 11 (Richard C. Reed ed., 1989)).
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contingency fee attorneys. 4 When hourly billing became widespread, the
number of billable hours expected of firm attorneys dramatically increased
as billable hours clocked and business generated assumed greater
importance in evaluating attorney contributions and compensation. 5 As
explained by one commentator, “[h]ourly billing, which started as a tool for
law office management, turned into a requirement for all timekeepers to
bill a large minimum number of hours per year. Salary, bonus and growth
within the firm began to be largely based on the number of hours billed.”6
Over the last decade the number of hours expected of associates
increased along with hikes in associate salaries.7 Pointing to the spiral of
increases in associate salaries followed by increases in billable hours
requirements, firm managers may engage in an exercise of blaming the
“greedy associates.” Another reaction involves blaming the “greedy
partners” who seek to preserve or even increase partner revenues, while
using higher salaries to recruit associates.
Insiders and outsiders alike have speculated on the short and long-term
effects of these increases in billable hours expectations. 8 To gauge the
effects of these increases, I conducted a 1999-2000 empirical study of
associate satisfaction, law firm culture, and billing practices. This study
used a mail questionnaire to survey 1000 associates practicing in Texas
firms with more than ten attorneys. 9 Five years later, in 2005, I conducted

4. See Robert E. Hirshon, Law and the Billable Hour, A Standard Developed in the
1960s May Be Damaging Our Profession, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2002, at 10 (noting that hourly
billing became the norm in the 1960s with the elimination of bar fee-schedules and a costconscious revolt against the one-line fee letters). While clients “enjoy the detail [of hourly
billing], firms enjoy the limited risk and the ease of valuing associates and partners.” Id.
5. For the history of hourly billing that traces the shift from “billable hours goals” to
“billable hour commitments,” see A.B.A. COMMISSION ON BILLABLE HOURS REPORT, supra
note 1, at 3 (observing that “billable hour commitments reached unreasonably high levels in
many firms” during the 1990s).
6. Gerald F. Phillips, The Rules of Professional Conduct Should Provide Guidance to
Attorneys with Respect to Billing Clients, PROF. LAW., Spring, 2004, at 2.
7. For a discussion of the connection between increases in associate salaries and
billable hour requirements, see Susan Saab Fortney, I Don’t Have Time To Be Ethical:
Addressing the Effects of Billable Hour Pressure, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 305, 305-06 (2003)
(referring to one analysis that estimated that associates would be working an extra 300 hours
a year to fund some salary increases.)
8. See, e.g., A.B.A. BILLABLE HOURS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-11
(reviewing the “unintended consequences” and “corrosive impact of emphasis on billable
hours”) and WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF THE TIME-BASED
BILLING BY ATTORNEY (1996) (analyzing the results of two surveys on billable hours
practices).
9. For a discussion of the study methodology, results, and recommendations, see Susan
Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm
Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 243-99
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another empirical study on attorney work-life issues and employer efforts
to assist attorneys in dealing with work-life conflicts. The 2005 study,
funded by The NALP Foundation, was a cross-profession national study of
supervised and managing attorneys in law firms, government offices, and
in-house counsel departments. Although the NALP Foundation study,
called In Pursuit of Attorney Work-Life Balance: Best Practices in
Management (“2005 NALP Foundation Work-Life Study”), focused on
work-life issues, billable hours pressure emerged as a concern shared by
numerous firm attorneys. 10 In discussing the time famine and other worklife conflicts encountered by practitioners, numerous study participants
commented on the tyranny of the billable hour.11
In an effort to formulate possible solutions to problems identified by
practitioners, this article uses information obtained in both studies to
discuss firm culture, compensation systems, attorney perceptions, and
conduct. For background and context, Part I describes the 2005 NALP
Foundation Work-Life Study rationale and methodology.
Part II
summarizes select study findings related to billable hours requirements and
pressure. The text of this article discusses select findings from the 2005
NALP Foundation Work-Life Study relating to billable hours requirements;
the footnotes compare those findings to the results of the 1999-2000
Associate Study. Part III concludes by considering what forces and players
will change the current course of conduct in which law firm leaders treat
increases in billable hours expectations as a necessary evil.
PART I: STUDY RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY
In 2005, The NALP Foundation conducted a national study of attorneys’
work-life balance issues to help attorneys and their employers better
understand and evaluate work-life conflicts and approaches for addressing
conflicts. Unlike other studies that focused on attorneys in one state or
practice setting, the study sought information from a national sample of
managing and supervised attorneys in different practice settings.
The national study involved two phases, one designed to yield
quantitative information and one designed to provide qualitative
information. In Phase One of the study, survey information was obtained
using two questionnaires, one for managing attorneys (“Managing Attorney
Work-Life Survey”) and one for supervised attorneys (“Attorney Work(2000) [hereinafter 1999-2000 Associate Survey].
10. For the complete study report, see SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY, IN PURSUIT OF ATTORNEY
WORK-LIFE BALANCE: BEST PRACTICES IN MANAGEMENT (Paula Patton ed., 2005)
[hereinafter 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY].
11. See infra Part II.
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Life Survey”). In February 2005, these questionnaires were mailed to a
random sample of attorneys in law firms, corporations, and government
agencies. 12
The study design called for 250 questionnaires to be sent to managing
attorneys in each of the following groups: government offices, corporate
legal departments, and law firms of varying sizes. 13 In addition, four
supervised attorneys in each of these segments were randomly selected to
receive the Attorney Work-Life Survey. After sampling and dropping
names for reasons such as address problems, the final sample consisted of
1,138 managing attorneys and 4,649 supervised attorneys in all segments. 14
The mailing of the Attorney Work-Life Survey and Managing Attorney
Work-Life Survey yielded 679 responses for a response rate of 12.3 percent
for supervised attorneys and 9.4 percent for managing attorneys. The
responses from managing and supervised attorneys were spread among
each practice segment. 15
After survey responses were received, nine focus group sessions were
conducted to provide a mix of perspectives from attorneys in different
practice areas, positions, and regions. 16 In these focus groups, managing
and supervised attorneys candidly and confidentially discussed work-life
issues. 17 The focus group discussions provided opportunities to explore
specific issues identified in Phase One of the study. 18 Focus group
participants also provided insights and anecdotal information related to
their experiences and perspectives on work-life issues, employer programs,
employer policies, and best practices related to attorneys balancing their

12. For information on the number of respondents in each category see 2005 NALP
FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY, supra note 10, at app. A, 84-85.
13. The law firm study population targeted attorneys in Large Firms, defined as firms
with more than 150 attorneys in all offices, Mid-Sized Firms defined as firms with 50 to 150
attorneys in all offices, and Small Firms, defined to be firms with 10 to 49 attorneys in all
offices. Id. at 84.
14. See id. at 83-86 (providing additional information on the survey methodology).
15. Id. at 84-85 (providing detailed information on the response rates of each practice
sector).
16. Id. at 85-86. A focus group coordinator used a variety of means to invite attorneys
to participate in focus groups in their area, including email invitations sent by law schools
and bar associations, as well as individual invitations sent to a random sample of attorneys
in the select cities). Id.
17. Id. at 86. Focus groups met in Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York City, and
Washington, D.C. Firm associates and partners met in separate focus groups. Id.
18. Id. at 86. An experienced focus group facilitator used a query script to guide the
discussion. The query script covered the following areas: (1) work-life conflicts and work
demands; (2) organizational policies, practices and work-life strategies; (3) organizational
culture and attitudes related to work-life issues; and (4) professional expectations and
attorney retention. Id.
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work and personal lives. 19
PART II: GENERAL PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS AND SURVEY
FINDINGS RELATED TO BILLING AND BILLABLE HOURS
EXPECTATIONS
The survey generated responses from managing and employed attorneys
working in government offices, in-house legal departments, and firms with
ten or more attorneys in all branches or offices worldwide. The discussion
below focuses on information provided by law firm respondents.
The majority of firm respondents (81.9 percent) were associates on the
partnership track, 8 percent were law firm attorneys not on the partnership
track, and 0.5 percent were contract attorneys. Most of these respondents
(93.2 percent) worked on a full-time basis and 6.8 percent worked on a
part-time basis. 20
Both survey instruments asked respondents to provide information
related to hours billed and billable hours expectations, if any. Survey data
reflect the trend among law firms to adopt minimum billing expectations or
When asked to indicate whether the respondent’s
requirements. 21
organization has a minimum billable hours expectation or requirement for
associates, 82.8 percent of firm managing attorneys checked “yes” and 85.6
percent of firm supervised attorneys checked “yes.” The questionnaires
then asked respondents to note the annual billing expectation or
requirement. The mean number of hours for the billable hours requirement
or expectation was 1,861 hours per year based on managing attorney
responses and 1,887 hours per year based on supervised attorney responses.
Table One below sets forth the mean calculations by firm size based on
supervised attorney responses on billable hours requirements and hours
actually billed.

19. See 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 85-115
(providing additional information on the focus groups).
20. Id. at 9. Among all respondents from the three practice sectors, 5.9 percent
indicated that they worked part-time. Id.
21. See Molly George, Do You Get What you Pay For? Measure Your Associates’ ROI,
LEGAL MGMT., May-June 2003, at 58, 62 (noting that most firms require between 1,700 and
2,300 billable hours from their associates). Across the Atlantic, “collegial” British firms
have joined the movement to set and increase billable hours targets. Gail Diane Cox, A Hop
Across the Pond Fills New York Firms’ Pockets, THE RECORDER, Sept. 11, 2003, at 2.
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Table One 22

Firm Size and Annual Minimum Billing Requirement and Hours Billed in 2004 as Reported
by Supervised Firm Attorneys

Firm Size

Mean Hours Required

Mean Hours Billed in 2004

Small Firms (10-49 attorneys)

1867

1886

Mid-size Firms (50-150 attorneys)

1895

1953

Large Firms (151-300 attorneys)

1919

1971

Very Large Firms (over 300 attorneys) 1930

2059

The mean calculations in Table One reflect that the mean for hours
required, as well as hours actually billed in 2004, increased with firm size.
In firms of all sizes, the mean number for hours billed exceeds the
minimum billable expectation, anywhere from nineteen hours for Small
Firms to 129 hours for Very Large Firms. Associates whose billable hours
production exceeds the minimum requirement may expect favorable
treatment when considered for bonuses and promotion. 23
Survey responses also reflect the movement among firms to use billable
hours production to determine bonuses. 24 In the survey, the majority of
managers and supervising attorneys reported that associate bonuses are
largely based on billable hours production. While eighty-three percent of
supervised attorneys indicated that bonuses were largely based on billable
hours production, only 67.2 percent of firm managing attorneys answered
22. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 10.
23. These associates may understand that, “most law firms tie associate performance
assessments to billable hours . . . .” Billable Hours: An On-Going Threat to Associate
Retention, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS FOR L. OFF., Sept. 2002, at 11.
24. See AMLAW 100 Revenues Climb, But not Profits, N.Y.L. J., July 2, 2001, at 1
(referring to the trend to link bonuses to billable hours). Questioning the wisdom of hoursdriven incentives, one large Texas firm has recently moved from an “hours-driven bonus
system” to a discretionary one. Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Thompson & Knight Raises
Associates’ Base Salaries, TEX. LAW. Aug. 9, 2004, at 1. In explaining the shift in
approach, the managing partner of Thompson & Knight explained, “We had an hours-driven
bonus system, and we decided that was not the best system for associate development, or for
client service . . . If it’s hours driven, people do what you measure.” Id.
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in the affirmative. This difference in percentages could reflect the fact that
different law firms may be represented by the respondents in the two
surveys. Another possibility is that a large percentage of associates may
perceive billable hours production as “driving the bonus train,” although
managing attorneys may not share that perception. A third possibility is
that some managing attorneys either genuinely believe that they base
bonuses on a variety of factors or decline to acknowledge the significant
role that hours play in bonus determinations. 25
Other survey responses provide supervised attorneys’ perspectives on
the firm incentives to clock hours. The majority of firm supervised
attorneys (fifty-two percent) agreed with the following statement, “My
career advancement is principally based on the number of hours that I
work.” 26 Only twenty-two percent disagreed with the statement. 27
Overall, a commonly expressed complaint related to “quantifying” worth
and contributions based on billable hours production. One supervised firm
attorney simply stated that “devotion equals promotion. The more you
work the higher you rise.” 28 Other respondents commented on other
One
consequences of emphasizing billable hours production. 29
consequence that should concern firms as providers of legal services and
clients is that rewarding high billable hours production “breeds overwork.”

25. Rather than using an hours-driven bonus system, some firms rely primarily on salary
adjustments to recognize total contributions made by attorneys. For example, Schmeltzer,
Aptaker & Shepard, P.C., a mid-size litigation boutique, evaluates partners and associates
“holistically,” considering a number of factors, as opposed to setting compensation solely on
hours. A.B.A. BILLABLE HOURS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 54-55.
26. Out of the fifty-two percent of respondents who indicated that they agree with this
statement, nineteen percent indicated that they “strongly agree.” In the 1999-2000
Associate Study, thirty-two percent of respondents noted that they “strongly agree” with the
statement, “My income and advancement within the firm are principally based on the
number of hours that I bill and collect.” Another 44 percent indicated that they “somewhat
agree” with the statement. 1999-2000 Associate Study at 277.
27. Approximately 4 percent of the 22 percent of respondents indicated that they
“strongly disagree” with the statement, “My career advancement is principally based on the
hours that I work.” 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, app. B at
97.
28. Id., at 19.
29. One respondent referred to this as an “obsession with the numbers.” Unpublished
data from the 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY (on file with author)
[hereinafter UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA]. In criticizing reliance on “the
numbers,” one commentary warns that “using the number of hours to bill clients and assess
productivity reduced attorneys’ work to something on par with a quota system” condemned
in other settings. Robert Pack, The Tyranny of the Billable Hour, WASH. LAW., Jan. 2005, at
20. Personnel claims may be an unintended consequence of “quantifying” contributions.
See 1999-2000 Associate Survey, supra note 9, at 275-78 (discussing the risks of
emphasizing quantity over quality).
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As explained by a supervised firm attorney, an “efficient and productive
associate” is “penalized,” while the associate who may “pad” hours “gets a
significant raise/bonus.” 30 Another survey respondent described the
competitive disadvantage for ethical associates as follows:
The 2000 billable hour requirement is an impossible task for an HONEST
hardworking attorney. I am here every day at least 12 hours and NEVER
take a lunch. But not everything is billable. I made my hours last year
but did so only because I did not take a vacation. I HATE being an
attorney! I have no life. I know that my colleagues regularly falsely
elevate their time entries. They have to because they all take lunches
everyday and leave at 5 or 6 every night. 31

This quotation captures the dilemma for ethical attorneys. If a firm
largely bases compensation on hourly production, ethical associates who
refuse to pad time may function at a competitive disadvantage when
compared to associates who inflate their time. Based on study findings
from my 1999-2000 empirical study on billable hours expectations and
firm culture, I opined that a serious deleterious effect of “quantifying”
value may be the exodus of ethical associates who leave private law
practice rather than rationalizing questionable billing practices.32
Focus group participants provided additional insights on the connection
between billing hours and firm culture, compensation, and attorney
conduct. Firm associates and partners alike discussed increased pressure to
bill. For example, in response to an inquiry on perceived changes in the
legal profession, one New York partner noted that the demand for hours is
“substantially higher.” 33
Partners participating in focus groups recognized the connection
between increases in billing expectations and salary hikes. One Chicago
partner questioned the trend of “mandating advancement in salary levels

30. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29.
31. Id.
32. The 1999-2000 Associate Survey asked respondents to indicate whether they agreed
with the following statement: “Billing pressure causes ethical and competent attorneys to
leave private law practice.” Forty-six percent agreed with the statement, while twenty-three
percent disagreed. The balance neither agreed nor disagreed. 1999-2000 Associate Survey,
supra note 9, at 279 (concluding that findings related to the “exodus of ethical associates”
may be “the most disturbing survey result because it suggests that billing pressure may be
causing firms to lose ethical associates and future leaders who uphold high ethical
standards”).
33. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29. Another partner
participant in the New York focus group concurred, stating, “Hours that are required now
are much greater than 10, 12 years ago, and I don’t see any let up in sight going forward,
either for partners or associates.” Id.
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based upon mandated billable hours for the year.”34 The partner explained
that this trend resulted first in a “real bump in associate-starting salaries”
and then an increase in the “level of billable hours . . . not only for
associates, but for partners.” 35
Commenting on increases in salary and billable hours requirements, an
associate participating in the New York focus group explained:
The hours keep going up and it doesn’t seem like there is a limit or ceiling
on how high a firm thinks it can put those billable hours. . . . As the hours
keep going up [there] is less recognition that you have a life outside of
work and more recognition that you are supposed to be here billing. . . . 36

Respondents frequently commented on employer emphasis on billable
hours production and the pressure to clock long hours. In struggling to
meet billing expectations or targets, respondents explained the additional
time commitment associated with completing non-billable tasks such as
recruiting, training, speaking, writing, and marketing. Some noted that this
non-billable work does not receive credit or consideration for bonus
purposes. 37
For many, billable hours pressure and long hours were at the heart of
work-life conflicts. From the standpoint of individual attorneys, the
“obsession with the numbers” may make it difficult for people to be
successful and have a balanced life. According to one respondent,
“Obviously, my major life struggle comes from billable hours. I NEVER
stay at work late because there’s work to be done. I ONLY stay late, and
deprive my family for a billable hour.” 38
A few managing attorneys commented on the personal toll taken when
firms increase billable hour expectations. One firm manager noted that it

34. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29.
35. Id. In speaking of the practice of “mandating advancement in salary levels based
upon a mandated billable hours for the year,” the Chicago partner stated, “I think the
profession would be better served and I think clients would be better served if that . . .
became an unethical practice.” Id.
36. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 67. The associate
reported a willingness to take “$25,000 less if you gave me back those fifty hours.”
UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29.
37. In recognition of the fact that attorneys must devote time to activities such as
continuing legal education, business promotion, and administrative work, the old rule of
thumb was that one-third of an attorney’s work time is non-billable. William G. Ross,
Kicking the Unethical Billing Habit, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2199, 2203 (1998) (explaining that
experts agree that approximately one-third of office time is “typically consumed by nonbillable activities”). Apparently, this message has not been conveyed to associates who
maintain that non-billable time should “count” toward billable requirements. UNPUBLISHED
WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29.
38. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 19.
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was “ludicrous” that large firms that require over 2000 hours as a minimum
“are also interested in quality of life issues.” 39 The manager went on to
say, “There is NOTHING more damaging to work-life issues than
unrealistic billable hours. You don’t need concierge services and other
perks like that if your people have enough of a balance in their lives.”40
In response to the open-ended inquiry that asked supervised attorneys to
describe improvements their employers could make to ameliorate work-life
conflicts, some respondents recommended eliminating billable
minimums. 41 Many more urged lowering the billable hours requirement or
target. 42 One respondent criticized a 2,000 per year minimum, stating: “It
is ridiculous that [2000 hours] is considered a ‘minimum.’ With a
minimum that high I have no need to know what a maximum or above
average expectation looks like.” 43
Beyond the work-life conflicts created by increased billable hours
pressure, focus group participants, like survey respondents, expressed
concern about inefficiency and unnecessary work performed when
compensation structures create incentives to bill.44 Speaking of high
billable hours expectations, one Chicago partner cautioned:
There has to be a temptation—and then it gets realized—of billing hours
that are, indeed, not necessary or not efficient because of the target of
maintaining those billable hours is more important and is a bigger
incentive than billing those hours, spending that time because you want to

39. Id. at 29.
40. Id.
41. As stated by one supervised attorney who completed the Attorney Work-Life
Survey:
Get rid of the billable minimum! It makes law firm work too stressful; it
encourages bill padding, it discourages training. Law firm culture already insures
we won’t say “no” to assignments, so we don’t need the 1950 threat looming over
us to make us work and because our compensation is tied to meeting the 1950
threshold, its unfair to penalize associates who don’t meet that requirement in
years when there wasn’t enough work available. It’s a bad system.
UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29.
42. Id. For example, one respondent recommended reducing “minimum billable hours
to a realistic goal, say 1,700-1,800.” Id.
43. Id.
44. The focus group respondents shared concerns similar to those expressed by various
commentators who question rewarding hours production. See 1999-2000 Associate Survey,
supra note 9, at 275-78. As suggested by Professor David B. Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati,
using hours to measure associates’ work creates an incentive for associates to inflate their
hours. David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers:
Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law
Firms, 8 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998).
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make sure that the clients’ interests were served. 45

Later in the focus group, the same Chicago partner explained that the
partner’s firm addressed the risk of inefficiency and overworking client
matters by requiring billing attorneys to “scrutinize very heavily the
hours.” 46 Such scrutiny may help allay client concerns about the impact of
firm practices of increasing billing requirements and calculating bonuses
based on hours billed. 47 In addition, clients or their representatives may
audit bills, looking for inefficiency and padding. 48
While supervising attorneys, clients, and their representatives may be
able to detect unnecessary billing entries, compromised performance may
be more difficult to detect. To obtain information related to work demands
and cognitive performance, the Attorney Work-Life Survey included two
inquiries related to cognitive performance. The first question asked
respondents to indicate the average amount of sleep they obtain. Among
law firm respondents, three percent reported that they average less than five
hours of sleep per night before a work day and 35.7 percent reported that
they average five to six hours of sleep per night.49 These attorneys may not
be obtaining adequate sleep for peak performance because sleep research
has revealed that individuals consistently sleeping six or fewer hours per
night may be accumulating a “sleep debt” that “cuts into their cognitive
abilities.” 50

45. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 20.
46. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29. As explained in a
commentary on billing practices, “partners should review bills with new associates each
month, so they can see how the law firm billed for their work.” Stephanie Francis Ward,
Billing Basics, Associates Need to Learn Nuances of Billing Before Starting Big Projects, 90
A.B.A. J. 42, 42, Oct. 2004 (quoting a fifth-year associate who suggests that such review
does not occur because “everyone is so busy”).
47. Unfortunately, anecdotal and study reports suggest that large percentages of
supervising attorneys may not be closely monitoring billing entries. In the 1999-2000
Associate Survey, sixty-one percent of firm associates reported that their supervising
attorneys never questioned their billing entries during the past year. 1999-2000 Associate
Survey, supra note 9, at 256. Over seventy percent of associates in firms with over 100
attorneys indicated that their billings had never been questioned in the past year. Id.
Supervising attorneys may be less inclined to devote time to scrutinizing billings, training,
and mentoring if the partner compensation turns on objective measures, such as hours billed
and business generated. See id. at 281-83 (discussing commentary and study findings
related to the affect of partner compensation systems on partner willingness to serve as
supervisors and mentors).
48. See Nat Slavin, The Never-Ending Quest for Legal Alternatives, CORP. LEGAL
TIMES, Feb. 2004, at 4 (explaining that the 1990s movement to hire independent companies
to audit bills was followed by a move to use software and Internet tools to examine fees
charged by outside counsel).
49. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, app. B at 94.
50. “Sleep Debts” Accrue When Nightly Sleep Totals Six Hours or Fewer, Penn Study
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Another survey inquiry asked respondents to register their opinions on
work demands insidiously undermining attorneys’ ability to provide top
quality legal services. The questionnaire asked supervised attorneys
whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “Working
long hours adversely affects my ability to think critically and creatively.”51
The majority of firm respondents (62.8 percent) agreed with the statement.
Only 19.2 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement.52
Other survey inquiries provided insights related to the personal and
professional toll taken when attorneys work long hours with little or no
balance between their personal and professional lives. Table Two below
sets forth the respondents’ level of agreement with statements related to
stress and work-life balance.
Table Two 53
Agreement with Statements on Stress and Work-Life Balance
as Reported by Firm Supervised Attorneys
Statement

Strongly Disagree

I feel stressed and

Disagree

Neither Agree/Disagree

Agree
37.9%

Strongly Agree

3%

22%

22.5%

14.6%

4.1%

16.5%

16.5%

44.7%

18.2%

7%

35.9%

20.3%

31.9%

4.9%

fatigued most of the
time
I must sacrifice
fulfillment outside
of work in order
to advance in my
career
I have a good balance
between my job
and personal life

Find People Respond Poorly, While Feeling Only “Slightly” Tired, SCI. DAILY, Mar. 14,
2003, available at http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2003/03/030314071202.htm
(referring to research with sleep-deprived individuals). According to Dr. Hans P.A. Van
Dongen, author of the sleep study, “[R]outine nightly sleep for fewer than six hours results
in cognitive performance deficits, even if we feel we have adapted to it.” Id.
51. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, app. B at 97.
52. Id. at 27. The following breaks down the respondents’ opinions on the Critical
Thinking Statement: 18.4 percent strongly agreed, 44.4 percent agreed, 17.9 percent neither
agreed nor disagreed, 16.5 percent disagreed, and 2.7 percent strongly disagreed. In the
1999-2000 Associate Survey, twenty-two percent of respondents strongly agreed with the
statement, “Working long hours adversely affects my ability to think critically and
creatively.” Another forty-two percent “somewhat agreed” with the statement. Only
nineteen percent disagreed with the statement. 1999-2000 Associate Survey, supra note 9, at
274 n. 219 (discussing survey results and commentary related to the adverse effect on
quality when attorneys consistently work long hours).
53. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 27.

CHRISTENSEN_FORTNEY

2/3/2011 10:09 PM

2005]

BILLABLE HOURS DERBY

113

As indicated in Table Two, the majority of law firm respondents
indicated that they feel stressed and fatigued most of the time. In addition,
the majority of these respondents believe that they must sacrifice
fulfillment outside of work in order to advance in their careers. By
comparison, smaller percentages of corporate and government respondents
agreed with these statements. Among the three practice sectors, law firm
respondents reported the lowest percentage of agreement with the
statement, “I have a good balance between my job and personal life.”54
Long hours, stress, and work-life conflicts may contribute to job
dissatisfaction and the desire to change employers. Survey results outlined
in Table Three reveal a relationship between the responses on the work-life
balance inquiries and respondents’ desire to change jobs in the next two
years.
TABLE THREE 55
COMPARISON BETWEEN AGREEMENT QUESTIONS AND DESIRE TO CHANGE JOBS
Positions on the Statements Reported as Means*

I have a good balance between my job and my personal life.
All

Government

Corporate

Firm

Yes, I
want to
change
employers
in the
next two
years

2.60

3.15

2.50

2.49

No, I do
not want
to change
employers
in the
next two
years

3.48

3.63

3.41

3.43

Not sure
if I want
to change
employers
in the
next two
years

3.07

3.79

3.36

2.85

54. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, app. B at 97.
55. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 32.
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I must sacrifice fulfillment outside of work in order to advance in my career.
Yes, I
want to
change
employers
in the
next two
years

3.81

3.27

3.79

3.93

No, I do
not want
to change
employers
in the
next two
years

2.87

2.34

2.93

3.07

Not sure
if I want
to change

3.52

2.89

3.25

3.70

employers
in the
next two
years

* Higher numbers reflect greater agreement with the statement because means were
calculated using the following scale:
1=Strongly Disagree 2=Disagree 3=Neither agree/disagree 4=Agree 5=Strongly agree

Based on the mean calculations set forth in Table Three, respondents not
interested in changing jobs reported more agreement with the statement, “I
have a good balance between my job and my personal life,” than
respondents interested in changing jobs. At the same time, the mean
calculation for supervised attorneys interested in changing jobs showed
more agreement with the statement, “I have to sacrifice fulfillment outside
of work in order to advance in my career,” as compared to the mean for
attorneys not interested in changing jobs. These results are consistent with
the commonly held belief that billable hours pressure and long work hours
play a prominent role in driving attorneys to the exit door.
“Numerous studies show that attorneys flee law firms because they
believe that firms’ high billable hours requirements prevent them from
balancing their work and their personal lives . . . .” 56 Findings from the
56. Joan Williams & Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Part-Time Progress, Letting Lawyers Cut
Back Can Save Money and Retain Talent—If Firms Do It Right, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 22,
2001, at 60 (noting that replacing a second or third-year associate costs between $200,000
and $500,000).
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2005 NALP Foundation Work-Life Study add to the body of empirical
research indicating that working long hours adversely affects morale, job
satisfaction, and retention.57 In the 2005 study, thirty-seven percent of firm
respondents reported that they were interested in changing jobs in the next
few years. 58 When asked to identify the factor that was most influential in
causing them to change jobs, the largest percentage of firm attorneys (26.4
percent) checked “reduction of work hours.”59 The largest percentage of
firm respondents who want to change jobs indicated that they were most
interested in a corporate counsel job. Evidently, these attorneys are not
leaving the field of law, but are interested in escaping billable hours
practice. 60
PART III: “BOTTOM-UP” AND MARKET PRESSURE TO
ADDRESS THE DAMAGING EFFECTS OF INCREASED
BILLABLE HOURS EXPECTATIONS
While practitioners may bemoan the emphasis on billable hours
production and other objective measures of success in law firms, they often
express pessimism about the possibility of changes to address work-life
conflicts. 61 In the 2005 NALP Foundation Work-Life study, various
respondents criticized current approaches used in firms, while suggesting
that lawyers are locked into the current system. For example, in response
to the open-ended question that asked respondents to describe
improvements to “ameliorate work-life conflicts,” one respondent stated,
“have everyone work less and earn less = fantasy.” 62 Another respondent

57. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY, supra note 10, 28-33.
58. Id., app. B at 95.
59. For more detailed discussion of the survey results related to morale, satisfaction, and
attrition, see id. at 95-96.
60. In the 1999-2000 Associate Survey, thirty-nine percent of respondents reported that
they were interested in changing employers in the next two years. When asked to indicate
the factor most influential in causing respondents to change jobs, the largest percentage
(twenty-eight percent) checked “reduction in hours.” The largest percentage of associates
who wanted to change jobs (thirty-seven percent) indicated that they were most interested in
a “corporate counsel position.” 1999-2000 Associate Survey, supra note 9, at 283-87.
61. As stated by one commentator:
Hourly billing causes the lawyer’s life to be consumed by the need to log an
increasing number of billable hours. Law firms tend to become “hours factories”
and the quality of the representation may decline as well as lawyer collegiality.
Even though lawyers have recognized the harm caused to their profession and
their client relationships, implementing change has been difficult.
Arthur G. Green, Thinking Outside the Box, BUS. L. TODAY, May-June 2004, at 17.
62. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29.
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suggested that firms “eliminate billable hours, which will never happen.” 63
A few focus group participants discussed the possibility of change
within law firms. One partner participating in a New York focus group
attributed recent changes to “bottom-up” pressure from associates who
communicate with their feet and leave firms. Change may occur if firms
recognize what one Chicago partner described as a “powerful business
rationale” for adopting policies that reduce “attrition of talented lawyers
and the consequent reduction in the need to spend money to recruit and
train lawyers. . . .” 64
To determine what policies and systems will address associate attrition,
firm managers can use feedback and recommendations provided by
Associate Retention or Quality of Life Committees. In the 2005 NALP
FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY, 41.6 percent of supervised firm
attorneys reported that they would “definitely use” a quality of life and/or
retention committee.65 Such committees can serve as channel for
associates to communicate their concerns and interests.
In 2002, a demonstration of “bottom-up” pressure occurred at Clifford
Chance, the world’s largest law firm. 66 Following the publication of the
results of The American Lawyer’s 2002 associate survey, in which Clifford
Chance rated last, the firm sought feedback from U.S. associates on its
personnel committee. 67 This group of six associates prepared a thirteenpage memorandum to Clifford Chance’s partners in its New York office
(“Associate Memorandum”).68 In referring to the “abysmal,” last place
ranking in The American Lawyer’s October 2002 ‘Associates Survey,’ (‘the
AmLaw Survey’), the Associate Memorandum stated, “our research has
convinced us that the AmLaw Survey captures neither the breadth nor the
depth of associate anger and frustration.” 69 Thereafter, the Associate

63. Id.
64. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY, supra note 10, at 53.
65. In the same study, only 12.3 percent of supervised firm attorneys indicated that their
firm currently had quality of life and/or retention committees. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION
WORK-LIFE STUDY, supra note 10, app. B at 87.
66. Bob Sherwood, Clifford Chance Calls “War Council,” FIN. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at
1.
67. Robert Lennon, The Memo Heard Round the World, AM. LAW., Dec. 2002, at 19
(discussing the “veritable uproar” and exaggerated media stories that followed news of the
associates’ memorandum).
68. See id. (describing the genesis of the Associate Memorandum).
69. The full text of the Associate Memorandum was first reprinted in an article written
by Bob Sherwood. See Sherwood, supra note 66, at 1. The memorandum itself explains
that it incorporates comments made by associates at a Town Hall meeting (attended by
approximately 140 associates), associates’ responses to a personnel committee survey, and
discussions among personnel committee members and various firm associates.
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Memorandum discussed problems that contribute to associate discontent.
After the Associate Memorandum was leaked to the press, the portion of
the memorandum that triggered the most attention was the 2,420 billable
hours requirement, the first “major problem” listed in the Associate
Memorandum. 70 After explaining that the “requirement constituted the
greatest area of discontent by far,” the Associate Memorandum elaborated
on specific consequences of the firm imposing such a requirement. 71 In
referring to feedback obtained from firm associates, the Associate
Memorandum stated:
Associates stated that the requirement is profoundly unrealistic,
particularly in slow areas of the firm. Moreover, Associates found the
stress on billable hours dehumanizing and verging on an abdication of our
professional responsibilities insofar as the requirement ignores pro bono
work and encourages “padding” of hours, inefficient work, repetition of
tasks, and other problems. Associates expressed concerns that the
requirement promotes misallocation of work to senior associates who
“need” the hours when less expensive junior associates could do the work.
Associates also stated that partners care only about associates’ billable
hours. 72

According to an article in The Financial Times that released the full text
of the Associate Memorandum, the claims that attorneys were encouraged
to “pad” billable hours sparked client inquiries.73 To address possible
client concerns related to overcharging and inflated legal bills, the firm
reportedly convened a “council of war” to “co-ordinate strategy and decide
on a united message to give to clients.” 74 The Financial Times article
indicated that the firm “said it would review the billing hours
requirement.” 75
Following the unfavorable press related to the billing requirement and
other associate complaints, Clifford Chance took steps to address associate
concerns. 76 Press reports suggested that these changes contributed to
Clifford Chance scoring the biggest percentage increase among firms rated
70. A copy of the full text is available at http://www.lawcost.com/clifchancememo.htm.
According to the Associate Memorandum, the requirements consisted of 2,200 hours of
“hard billable” work and 220 hours of “soft billable” time. After the memorandum was
leaked, a firm representative confirmed that the firm set a 2,200 hour “target,” while
encouraging associates to spend time outside client billables. Lennon, supra note 67 at 19.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Sherwood, supra note 66, at 1.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Amy Vincent, On the Move, AM. LAW., Oct. 2003, at 103 (reviewing results and
significant changes of firms rated in the 2003 AM LAW annual mid-level associate survey).
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in The American Lawyer’s 2003 Associate Survey. 77 The American
Lawyer indicated that one Clifford Chance associate believed that “the firm
has finally convinced associates that it takes their concerns seriously,” and
another respondent hailed “the revocation of the 2,420-hour billables
requirement.” 78
Reflecting on the Clifford Chance saga illustrates an interesting interplay
of different forces and dynamics involved in large firm practice. First, the
story started with The American Lawyer survey. Such surveys provide a
vehicle for disgruntled associates to grade, laud, lampoon, and criticize
their firms. Firms, particularly those seeking to be included in The
American Lawyer listing of the “top 20 firms” in the legal profession, may
take steps to improve their ratings. 79 Second, media reports may affect
firm reputation, influence client perceptions, and trigger changes in firm
policies and practices. In retrospect, “bottom-up” pressure from Clifford
Chance associates, coupled with partner desire to improve survey ratings
and the need to avoid client defections, may have led to the firm’s decision
to revoke the 2,420-hour billing target.
The efficacy of “bottom up” pressure largely depends on firm size,
position, composition, economics, and culture. In some firms, partners
who view associates as fungible may discount the need to respond to
associate complaints and concerns about billable-hours requirements and
firm practices.
Even recalcitrant partners who resist changes sought by associates may
take a different stance when forced to deal with market pressure.
Specifically, partners may be persuaded to make changes if failure to do so
adversely affects their ability to retain and attract clients. This could occur
if consumers considered the prospective firms’ attrition rates and billable
hours expectations.
General counsel for corporations, as buyers of legal services, are the best
prepared client representatives to evaluate the firms that court their
business. 80 Over the last two decades, general counsel for corporations

77. Id. (reporting that Clifford Chance’s score rose from 2.74 in 2002 to 3.398 in 2003,
a twenty-four percent increase in the firm’s overall rating).
78. Id.
79. In 2003, The American Lawyer introduced a list of the “best law firms in the land.”
Aric Press, The A-List, AM. LAW., Sept. 2004, at 84. This list is based on a “carefully
weighted ranking” derived from surveys of the AmLaw 200, the highest-grossing U.S.
headquartered firms. The ranking is based on the following standards: revenue per lawyer,
pro bono work, associate satisfaction, and diversity. Id. at 84-85.
80. See Brad Blickstein, “Mr. Inside . . . Mr. Outside”; Getting the Right Message to
General Counsel, N.J. LAW.: THE WKLY. NEWSPAPER, Dec. 6, 2004, at 2487 (referring to the
“increasing sophistication of general counsel as buyers of legal services”).
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have used different approaches in selecting outside counsel. Faced with
intense pressure to reduce amounts expended for outside counsel, many of
these approaches involved cost-cutting measures, such as using
independent legal auditors, task-based billing, and research outsourcing.81
While the results of these efforts may be mixed, general counsel continue
to proactively seek ideas to minimize the costs of outside counsel while
maintaining and enhancing the quality of legal representation.82 Surveys of
general counsel reveal that their most pressing concern is controlling the
costs of outside counsel. 83
Corporate counsel are increasingly asking law firms to lower their bills 84
and to use alternative fee arrangements. 85 In experimenting with
alternative fee arrangements, some general counsel recognize that the
nature of billable hours practice may drive up the costs of legal services
because the billable hours fee structure rewards inefficiency. 86 As
explained by a law firm consultant, “Rates don’t drive costs, [inefficient]
staffing does.” 87
Beyond the inefficiency associated with billing hours to maximize
income, increasing billable-hours requirements within firms also impacts
the costs of legal services. As discussed in Part II, billable-hours pressure
is driving many attorneys out of private practice. In addition to tangible
attrition costs, attrition also can adversely impact the firm clients who are
served by departed attorneys. Unless the outside law firm absorbs costs of
“bringing the new attorney up to speed,” attrition can increase the cost of

81. For a review of the relative success of popular approaches used by general counsel
in the 1990s, see Krysten Crawford, When Good Ideas Go Bad; In the 1990s, A Host of
Trendy New Ideas Were Supposed to Change the Practice of Law as We Knew It, But Did
they Actually Work? LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at 21.
82. Irving B. Levinson, 101 Ways to Control Outside Legal Costs; Part I, Do You
Really Need to Hire Outside Counsel? Read This First, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1995, at
11.
83. See Cutting Costs, NAT’L L. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at 6 (reporting that for the third year
in a row a American Corporate Counsel survey of in-house counsel indicated that their
“most pressing concern is trying to reduce outside legal spending”).
84. Tom McCann, Corporate Counsel Urge Law Firms to Use Business Sense, CHI.
LAW., May 2003, at 36.
85. Thomas L. Sager, All Corporate Lawyers Should Embrace Alternative Billing,
CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1997, at 13 (discussing DuPont’s use of alternative fee
arrangements).
86. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Carr & Mark D. Wolf, IN-HOUSE SUPPLEMENT, Service Means
More than Just Billable Hours, TEX. LAW, Feb. 3, 2003, at 13 (two in-house counsel
promoting a new fee-structuring model in which outside counsel share risks and rewards).
87. Crawford, supra note 81, at 21 (quoting Peter Zeughauser, a Newport Beach,
California consultant).
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attorneys who bill on an hourly basis.88 Attrition may also adversely affect
institutional knowledge and personal relationships. 89 Understanding the
costs of turnover, some general counsel are “considering attrition” and
quality-of-life issues that affect attrition “in deciding which firms to
retain.” 90 General counsel factoring attrition into their selection of firms
may spur firms to take additional steps to reduce attrition. As suggested
above, setting a reasonable billing target or requirement should improve the
retention of many attorneys who indicate that they are changing jobs for a
reduction in hours. 91
Given the connection between attrition and billable hours pressure,
general counsel should seek information on firms’ billable hours
requirements and factor that information into their decision to hire
particular firms. General counsel who focus on the risks and costs
associated with high billable hours requirements will realize that such
information does not merely relate to firms’ internal operations, but rather
to the cost and quality of legal services. 92 Those general counsel who
consider billable hours requirements when hiring outside firms recognize
that high billable hours requirements create incentives to “overwork” files.
They also appreciate that attorneys’ ability to think critically and creatively
may be adversely affected by consistently working long hours.
In retaining outside counsel, general counsel already weigh a variety of
factors. 93 As demonstrated by the leadership role that general counsel have

88. See Peter D. Zeughauser, The Beauty Contest: Responding to the RFP, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 14, 1991, at 45 (recommending that law firms address corporate concerns about
turnover by undertaking to “absorb the cost of bringing new lawyer up to speed”).
89. Joan Williams & Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Letting Lawyers Cut Back Can Save
Money and Retain TalentBIf Firm Do It Right, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at 60.
90. See Lorelie S. Masters, What Women (Lawyers) Want—And Need, More Than 200
Attorneys Gather in D.C. for NAWL Conference on Career Development, Law Firm
Initiatives, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at 18. (citing reports from Professor Joan Williams,
Co-Chair of the Attorney Retention Project at American University’s Washington College
of Law, and in-house attorneys Carole Jordan of Fannie Mae and Patricia Merrill of GE
Asset Management).
91. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
92. See Tamara Loomis, Partner Status is a Billing Issue, NAT’L L.J., 2005, at 8.
Beyond scrutinizing bills after legal work is already performed, some general counsel have
sought information on firm structures and systems. For example, with the recent increase in
the number of non-equity partners in firms, the legal department at E.I. du Pont De Nemours
& Co. has asked firms to reveal the status of their partners when the firms ask for fee
increases. Id.
93. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, LLP, Top of Mind, Second Annual Survey of In-House
Counsel, http://www.klng.com/TOM_brochure_2004/media/topofmind_11.pdf (last visited
July 24, 2005). According to a study of senior in-house counsel at FORTUNE 500 and
1000 businesses, eighty-nine percent ranked “effective communication” as a top factor when
choosing outside counsel. Id.
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played in considering the diversity of the firms they retain, general counsel
can positively influence firms who compete in “beauty contests” for
corporate legal work. 94 By seeking information on firms’ attrition rates
and billable hours requirements, general counsel may trigger firms to
rethink the current course of affairs.
CONCLUSION
The voices of study participants put a personal face on the costs and
consequences of billable hour pressure. Firm leaders who understand the
personal and professional toll of increasing billable hour requirements
should fashion alternative work and compensation structures. Even firm
principals reticent to change may respond to “bottom-up” and market
pressure once they recognize the business case for allowing alternative
approaches, such as reduced-hours arrangements for attorneys. 95
Discriminating general counsel who seek information on firms’ attrition
rates and billable hour requirements can play an important role in causing
firms to withdraw from the billable hour derby. As suggested by two inhouse attorneys who urged firms to be “customer-focused,” “in-house
counsel will continue to insist on paying for value and efficiency and such
insistence will ultimately lead to a changed law firm economic model.” 96
Rather than waiting for general counsel to inquire about attrition rates
and billable hours requirements, law firms leaders could impress general
counsel and other consumers of legal services by taking steps to address
various deleterious effects of billable hours practice. For example, firms
could lower onerous billable hours requirements and discontinue linking
94. See Rick Palmore, A Call to Action-Diversity in the Legal Profession, Association of
Corporate Counsel (Oct. 2004), at http://www.acca.com/public/accapolicy/diversity.pdf. A
Call to Action, authored by Rick Palmore, the Chief Legal Office of Sara Lee, and signed by
numerous general counsel across the country, stated that firms could “positively distinguish
themselves through their diversity efforts.” The signatories also stated that we “intend to
end or limit our relationship with firms whose performance consistently evidence a lack of
meaningful interest in being diverse.” Id.; see also Leigh Jones, GCS Call For Greater
Diversity Among Top-Tier Firms, THE RECORDER, Mar. 31, 2005, at 3 (explaining that A
Call to Action, signed by hundreds of general counsel, is a revised version of a 1999
proclamation calling for more diversity in law firms). For a description of general counsel
efforts to promote and track firm diversity, see Nathan Koppel, The 27 Winners of the Oil
Giant’s Beauty Contest Have One Thing in Common: The Firms Can Show—Through
Hiring and Billable Hours-How Serious They are about Diversity, CORP. COUNS., Aug.
2004, at 106.
95. 2005 NALP Foundation Work-Life Study, supra note 10, at 50-51. For an excellent
commentary on the business justification for allowing attorneys to work less and make less,
see Joan C. Williams & Cynthia Thomas Calvert, SOLVING THE PART-TIME PUZZLE: THE
LAW FIRM’S GUIDE TO BALANCED HOURS 2005 62.
96. Carr & Wolf, supra note 86, at 13.
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bonuses to billable hours production. 97 By adopting the Law Firm Billing
Policy and “best practices” described in the ABA Billable Hours
Commission Report, law firms can distinguish themselves when seeking
business from new clients and fortifying relationships with existing
clients. 98 In the long run, the desire to attract and retain clients may bring
billable hour requirements back to a reasonable level, promising to improve
the quality of work for client and quality of life for firm lawyers.

97. According to the A.B.A. Billable Hours Commission Report, a compensation
“system that ties compensation—whether salary or bonus—directly to billable hours with no
flexibility and no reflection . . . is a ‘worst practice.’” A.B.A. BILLABLE HOURS COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 1, at 46.
98. Id. at 46-51. To discourage associates from “simply compiling more hours for more
money,” the A.B.A. Billable Hours Commission recommends that firms “place a ceiling on
the number of hours, over which no additional compensation in salary or bonus will be paid
regardless of how high the hours.” Id. at 47.

